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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Caldwell Scott McMullen was unlawfully pat searched during a traffic stop. The officer
found methamphetamine during the pat search. After the district court denied his motion to
suppress that evidence, Mr. McMullen pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver. As part of his plea agreement, he reserved the right to challenge the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress on appeal.
The district court erred by denying Mr. McMullen's motion where the officer unlawfully
pat searched Mr. McMullen without reason to believe he was armed and presently dangerous.
This Court should vacate Mr. McMullen's conviction, reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 18, 2018, at approximately twelve-thirty at night, Patrol Sergeant Willie
Cowell conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle after he observed it straddling the broken white line
and weaving within the two northbound lanes. (Tr.,1 p.7, L.21 - p.9, L.19.) Sergeant Cowell
spoke to the driver, Caldwell McMullen, regarding the vehicle's registration, which came back to
a different make and model car. (Tr., p.11, L.17 - p.12, L.25.) Sergeant Cowell also noticed a
faint odor of burnt marijuana, so when writing a citation for fictitious display, he called for a
drug dog. (Tr., p.13, Ls.4-7, p.15, Ls.7-14.)

No dogs were available, however. (Tr., p.15,

Ls.15-16.)

1

Citations to the "Tr." refer to the electronically designated pages of the three hearings collected
into one electronic file.
1

Sergeant Cowell conducted a warrants check on both the driver and passenger and then
completed the citation for fictitious display. (Tr., p.13, L.23 -p.14, L.3, p.15, L.25 - p.16, L.7.)
There were also some inconsistencies with the title of the vehicle, and Sergeant Cowell discussed
that with Mr. McMullen, as well as the odor of burnt marijuana. (Tr., p.16, Ls.8-14.) Sergeant
Cowell recognized Mr. McMullen from a previous encounter, and he suspected that
Mr. McMullen was possibly involved with drug trafficking between two counties. 2 (Tr., p.16,
L.15-p.17, L.17.)
While Sergeant Cowell questioned Mr. McMullen about why his vehicle might smell like
marijuana, Mr. McMullen offered his consent to search the vehicle.

(Tr., p.19, Ls.1-24.)

Sergeant Cowell asked the passenger to remain in the vehicle and asked Mr. McMullen to step
away from the vehicle, and advised him "So I'd like to pat you down as you step out of the
vehicle, make sure you don't have any weapons." (Tr., p.20, Ls.13-18.) After checking the front
and rear pockets of Mr. McMullen's pants, he ran his hand across the front of the lower abdomen
below the belt line, above the genitalia. (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-15.) When he got to that area, he felt a
significant bulge in Mr. McMullen's pocket below the belt line, and he testified that it felt
"crystalline in nature" as he ran his palm across it.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.19-24.) He immediately

identified the crystalline substance as contraband and handcuffed Mr. McMullen. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.1-5.) Upon searching Mr. McMullen's vehicle, Sergeant Cowell also located a brass pipe
fitting containing what he believed to be the residue ofbumt marijuana. (Tr., p.30, Ls.4-24.)

2

Sergeant Cowell had heard that two police officers, on two separate occasions in 2016, had
stopped Mr. McMullen late at night heading northbound through town. (Tr., p.18, Ls.3-7.)
Katrina Morrison was a passenger each time. (Tr., p.18, Ls.7-8.) Then, in February of 2017,
Sergeant Cowell arrested Katrina Morrison with almost an ounce of methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11.) She told him she was bringing the methamphetamine from Dufort Road and
headed to Libby, Montana. (Tr., p.18, Ls.11-14.) At the time, Sergeant Cowell believed that
Mr. McMullen lived on Dufort Road. (Tr., p.18, Ls.15-17.)
2

Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Mr. McMullen
committed one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and one count of
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.42-44, 165-167.)

Thereafter,

Mr. McMullen filed a Memorandum of Law on Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.104-109.) He
asserted that the pat-down search of his person was unlawful because the officer conducting the
frisk for weapons did not believe Mr. McMullen was armed and dangerous, and could not
identify any safety concerns or threat of harm, but instead, patted Mr. McMullen down because
“weapons and drugs are notorious for going hand in hand.” (R., pp.108-109.) Mr. McMullen
asserted that the evidence gathered against him should be suppressed because the pat-down
search of his person could not be justified as a Terry frisk for weapons. (R., pp.108-109.)
A hearing was held on Mr. McMullen’s motion. (See 9/6/18 Tr.) The district court heard
testimony from Sergeant Cowell. (Tr., p.5, L.14 – p.36, L.16.) Sergeant Cowell testified that
Mr. McMullen had a demeanor calm in nature prior to the Terry frisk; however, Sergeant Cowell
himself was extremely on edge because Mr. McMullen took almost half a mile to pull over on
the highway, and he got “inconsistencies and reasons for violations” which the officer found
alarming. (Tr., p.23, L.19 – p.24, L.19.) These facts, combined with his prior knowledge of
Mr. McMullen, made Sergeant Cowell “very uneasy about the whole situation.” (Tr., p.24, L.20
– p.25, L.4.) Sergeant Cowell was concerned about his safety because (as he also stated in his
report) “weapons and drugs notoriously go hand in hand. That is case law.” (Tr., p.35, Ls.6-8.)
The district court issued a written decision in which it made the following relevant
findings of fact at the point after the citation was delivered to Mr. McMullen:
Cowell asked McMullen about the present odor of burnt marijuana in the Dodge.
Both McMullen and Collier denied having any marijuana on their persons and
denied having any knowledge of marijuana in the Dodge. McMullen attempted to
explain the odor by suggesting that he had loaned the Dodge to a woman with a
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prosthetic leg who smoked marijuana for medical reasons. He also brought up
other people that might have been in the Dodge. During this conversation,
McMullen said to Cowell, “I’ll allow you to search the vehicle,” or words to that
effect. Cowell was standing at the driver’s side window, McMullen was seated in
the driver’s seat, and Collier was in the passenger seat. Cowell directed Collier to
remain in the Dodge and asked McMullen to step out of the Dodge. Cowell told
McMullen that he would be patted down to make sure he did not have any
weapons. McMullen stepped out, turned around and faced the Dodge, placed his
hands on the Dodge, and allowed a pat search of his person. McMullen was
wearing denim jeans and a black sweatshirt.
As Cowell conducted the pat down search, running the palms of his hands over
the exterior portions of McMullen’s clothing that might conceal a weapon, Cowell
felt a significant bulge below the belt line of McMullen’s pants, in the lower
abdomen area. Cowell could feel the bulge was crystalline in nature, and based
upon his experience, he immediately identified it as being consistent with
contraband. Cowell placed McMullen in handcuffs. Cowell had McMullen lean
back against the front end of his patrol car, unbuttoned McMullen’s pants, and
retrieved about two ounces of methamphetamine.
(R., pp.114-115.)
The district court listed the specific and articulable facts known to Sergeant Cowell at the
moment of the frisk which made him suspect that Mr. McMullen was armed and dangerous: (1)
the defendant was operating a vehicle in a manner that violated the rules of the road; (2) the
encounter took place late at night; (3) an odor of burnt marijuana was coming from the vehicle;
(4) the officer was aware of the defendant’s reputation for drug trafficking; (5) the defendant was
wearing loose fitting clothing; (6) there was a passenger in the vehicle. (R., pp.117-118.) The
court concluded that these facts, with rational inferences and the officer’s experience, justified
the officer’s suspicion that Mr. McMullen was armed and dangerous. (R., p.120.) The court
denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp.112-122.)

4

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. McMullen entered a conditional guilty plea. 3
(R., pp.156-167.)

Mr. McMullen waived a PSI and chose to be sentenced that same day.

(Tr., p.78, L.23 - p.79, L.1) The district court sentenced Mr. McMullen to five years, with two
and one-half years fixed, to be served concurrently with the sentence in Boundary County case
number CRl 1-18-624. (Tr., p.80, Ls.8-12; R., pp.168-173.) Mr. McMullen filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment ofConviction. 4 (R., pp.139-142, 182-186.)

3

The written plea agreement indicated that Mr. McMullen was entering "a conditional guilty
plea in which you are reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues." (R., p.159.)
Mr. McMullen' s intent to enter a conditional plea was evidenced by his responses on the Plea
Agreement form, as well as the Notice of Appeal which stated that he was appealing from the
adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. (R., pp.139-141, 156-164.) However, there appeared
to be some confusion at the entry of plea hearing. (See Tr., p.75, L.21 -p.77, L.19.) The district
court verbalized uncertainty as to whether it could accept a conditional guilty plea because
Mr. McMullen had entered a plea agreement to resolve two separate cases (this case and
Boundary County case number CRl 1-18-624), in which the district court had agreed to be bound
to sentence Mr. McMullen to concurrent prison sentences of five years, with two and a half years
fixed on each case. However, the district court was mistaken; Mr. McMullen could still enter a
conditional plea of guilty, thereby preserving his right to appeal from the order denying his
motion to dismiss in this case.
4
The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 25, 2018, and indicated that it was an appeal from
the Memorandum and Order denying Mr. McMullen's motion to suppress, making it prematurely
filed from the Judgment of Conviction, pursuant to I.AR. 11, 14.
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McMullen's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McMullen's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Because the officer did not have a reasonable belief that Mr. McMullen was armed and

dangerous when he pat searched Mr. McMullen, the district court erred by denying
Mr. McMullen's motion to suppress the evidence obtained.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland, 135

Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate
court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by substantial
evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McMullen's Motion To Suppress Where
Sergeant Cowell Unlawfully Pat Searched Mr. McMullen Absent A Reasonable Belief
That He Was Armed And Dangerous
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that '[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."'

State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in

original). A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless it falls within "one of
several narrowly drawn exceptions." State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012). The State
bears the burden of demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure falls into an exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472 (Ct. App. 2002).
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The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), recognized
another exception to the warrant requirement-a pat search for weapons.

"Under Terry, an

officer may conduct a limited pat-down search, or frisk, 'of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons."' State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
818 (2009) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16). The Terry exception to the warrant requirement was
created for "the protection of the police officer and others nearby." Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
However, a Terry search must "be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation." Id. at 25-26. In order to justify the search aspect of a "Terry frisk", the State must
demonstrate specific, objectively reasonable and articulable facts that yield a reasonable
inference that the friskee is armed and presently dangerous. Id. 392 U.S. at 24; see also State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662 (2007) (italics in original) (holding the district court erred in basing

"its determination that Sgt. Baker was justified in initiating the weapons search upon a subjective
feeling attributed to Sgt. Baker rather than a determination as to 'whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger"') (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.)
As explained by the United States Supreme Court:
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether
the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not
to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
expenence.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted).

As the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Downing recently determined:
Therefore, in evaluating whether a frisk was justified, a court must determine
whether the officer had objective grounds to believe that the individual posed a
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risk of danger to himself or others. An officer may reasonably justify this type of
search if the objective "facts available to the officer at the moment of the [ ]
search [would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action
taken was appropriate." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Wright, 134 Idaho at 82, 996 P.2d at 301.

State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 30 (2017) (holding that pat search was unreasonable where
defendant had calm demeanor and exhibited no weapon-shaped bulge or furtive movements,
even where location contained unsecured people who had admitted to recently smoking
methamphetamine and one person was behaving erratically).
In this case, Sergeant Cowell failed to articulate any specific facts which would have led
reasonably to the inference that Mr. McMullen was, in fact, armed and presently dangerous.
The district court found the following facts justified a Terry frisk for weapons:

The

district court listed the specific and articulable facts known to Sergeant Cowell at the moment of
the frisk which made him suspect that Mr. McMullen was armed and dangerous:

(1) the

defendant was operating a vehicle in a manner that violated the rules of the road; (2) the
encounter took place late at night; (3) an odor of burnt marijuana was coming from the vehicle;
(4) the officer was aware of the defendant's reputation for drug trafficking; (5) the defendant was
wearing loose fitting clothing; (6) there was a passenger in the vehicle. (R., pp.117-118.) The
court concluded that these facts, with rational inferences and the officer's experience, justified
the officer's suspicion that Mr. McMullen was armed and dangerous. (R., p.120.)
As for Mr. McMullen's demeanor, Sergeant Cowell testified that he was calm in nature;
however, Sergeant Cowell himself was extremely on edge because Mr. McMullen took almost
half a mile to pull over on the freeway, and he got "inconsistencies and reasons for violations"
which the officer found alarming. (Tr., p.23, L.19-p.24, L.19.) These facts, combined with his
prior knowledge of Mr. McMullen, made Sergeant Cowell "very uneasy about the whole
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situation." (Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.25, L.4.)

Sergeant Cowell was concerned about his safety

because (as he also stated in his report) "weapons and drugs notoriously go hand in hand. That is
case law." (Tr., p.35, Ls.6-8.) The officer also expressed concern about large amounts of
contraband and the presence of weapons, "The large amounts of the illegal drugs or contraband
are often times coupled with a person having weapons on their body, in their vehicle."
(Tr., p.25, Ls.11-13.)

However, "[t]he large amounts of the illegal drugs" the officer was

concerned about were not located until after the Terry frisk for weapons was conducted. His
belief that Mr. McMullen may have accompanied Ms. Morrison as she transported illegal drugs
to Montana in the past was nothing more than a hunch. Further, the amount Ms. Morrison was
arrested with was less than an ounce, short of the amount necessary for a trafficking charge.
(Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11; LC.§ 37-2732B(4).)
However, the factors identified by the district court do not justify a Terry frisk for
weapons.

In State v. Davenport, the State asserted that four factors justified the officer's

decision to frisk Mr. Davenport: (1) the encounter took place at night; (2) the officer knew
Mr. Davenport from prior domestic disturbances; (3) the officer was aware that Mr. Davenport
was a methamphetamine user; and (4) Mr. Davenport placed his hands into his large, baggy
pockets after the officer repeatedly instructed him not to do so. 144 Idaho 99, 102 (Ct. App.
2007). The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the totality of the circumstances did not
give rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Davenport was armed and dangerous.
As the Court of Appeals discussed in Davenport, the fact that the encounter occurred late
at night could "be a relevant factor, but it is most significant if the location is dangerous or
associated with crime." Davenport, 144 Idaho at 102 (holding that, while the encounter did take
place at night, there was no indication it was in a particularly dangerous location or a high crime
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area). Here, the encounter took place at 12:30 a.m., a time which is not particularly late at night
and noticeably absent were any indications that this area was a high crime area or otherwise
dangerous. (R., p.104.)
The Davenport Court also considered “[a]n officer’s previous knowledge of the
defendant may also contribute to justification for a protective search, particularly if the officer
knows that a defendant carries a weapon, is involved in drug trafficking, or is predisposed to
violence.” 144 Idaho at 102. However, the case the Court relied upon was one where the
defendant had been convicted of drug trafficking offenses. See Davenport at 102, citing United
States v. Cornelius, 391 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 2004) (officer recognized defendant from
previous arrests, knew he had outstanding drug distribution warrants, and defendant placed his
hand in his jacket pocket and did not obey officer’s directive to remove it).
Here, Sergeant Cowell had simply heard rumors that Mr. McMullen was in the presence
of a person whom Sergeant Cowell had, on a separate occasion, arrested for possessing less than
an ounce of methamphetamine. (Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11.)
In Davenport, the Court of Appeals also considered the officer’s observation of the
person’s demeanor, including attitude, nervousness, signs of being under the influence, or other
unusual behavior could give rise to a reasonable fear for an officer’s safety. 144 Idaho at 102.
However, the Court of Appeals concluded “although the officer was aware that Davenport was a
methamphetamine user, there is no indication that he thought that Davenport was under the
influence of drugs at the time of their encounter. Although Davenport was not completely
cooperative, for he kept returning his hands to his pockets, the tenor of the conversation between
Davenport and the officer was casual and calm. Davenport exhibited no aggression nor
antagonism toward the officer, and placing hands in pockets is not unusual for someone standing
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outside on a late autumn night in Boise." Id. 144 Idaho at 103. The Davenport Court concluded
that the totality of the circumstances did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Davenport
was armed and dangerous.
The pat search in this case was not justified because Sergeant Cowell had no reason to
believe that Mr. McMullen was '"armed and presently dangerous."' See Bishop, 146 Idaho at
818 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30). Sergeant Cowell himself testified that he did not believe
the information that he had previously arrested Mr. McMullen on a warrant was pertinent to the
incident.

(Tr., p.33, Ls.9-15.) Although Sergeant Cowell also testified that he had a prior

experience in which a vehicle smelled of marijuana and whose passenger had a rifle on the
floorboard and gun down his pants (Tr., p.28, L.4 - p.29, L.2), it is not reasonable for Sergeant
Cowell to henceforth infer that every time he smells marijuana there is a pistol in someone's
pants.

Sergeant Cowell testified that he told Mr. McMullen he was going to pat him down

because "weapons and drugs notoriously go hand in hand." (Tr., p.35, Ls.2-8.) Sergeant Cowell
testified that Mr. McMullen was not nervous, told the officer he could search his vehicle, and did
not have a reputation for violence. (Tr., p.34, Ls.2-20.) He testified that he was concerned for
his safety because he thought Mr. McMullen was lying to him about the registration on the
vehicle and, when asked about weapons, he said:
A: Just the sheer fact that I requested a pat-down and I was in the middle of a
drug investigation, I'm concerned about my safety. I'm concerned that there's
weapons present because Q: You didn't put that in your report?
A: Well, actually I kind of did because I stated not only to Mr. McMullen on the
scene, but also in my report that weapons and drugs notoriously go hand in hand.
That is case law.
And so, when I'm in the middle of a drug investigation, and coupled with
information that I had, beyond just the fact that it was a drug investigation, that is
very much of concern.
I'm sorry, go ahead.
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Q: That's pretty much all you said in your report for giving a reason for a patdown?
A: Was checking for weapons?
Q: Yes.
A: Yes.
(Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.18.)
Sergeant Cowell also testified that the clothing Mr. McMullen was weanng was
concerning to him because "[l]oose-fitting clothing, again, is always a concern because it's easy
to hide weapons in."

(Tr., p.36, Ls.5-8.)

While one of the factors influencing whether a

reasonable person in the officer's position would conclude that a particular person was armed
and dangerous is "whether there were any bulges in the suspect's clothing that resembled a
weapon" State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2009), loose-fitting clothing is not a factor
justifying such a conclusion. Sergeant Cowell had no reason to believe that Mr. McMullen was
armed and dangerous, and so the pat search was unlawful.
None of the circumstances known to Sergeant Cowell at the time of the search
established a reasonable belief that Mr. McMullen was armed and presently dangerous. See

Henage, 143 Idaho at 661.

The fruits of the search of Mr. McMullen must therefore be

suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478488 (1963); State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549 (Ct. App. 2000).

D.

The Doctrine Of Inevitable Discovery Is Inapplicable In This Case
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set out the

inevitable discovery doctrine, stating: "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received."

See also State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 32 (2017). The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v.
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Rowland held, “Although those lawful means need not be the result of a wholly independent
investigation, they must be the result of some action that actually took place (or was in the
process of taking place) that would inevitably have led to the discovery of the unlawfully
obtained evidence.” 158 Idaho 784, 787 (Ct. App. 2015).
The district court did not address the prosecutor’s alternate argument that, pursuant to the
doctrine of inevitable discovery, Sergeant Cowell would have discovered the methamphetamine
on Mr. McMullen’s person after he found the item of drug paraphernalia during the consensual
search of the car. 5 (Tr., p.48, L.18 – p.49, L.3.) However, this argument is not persuasive where
the possession of paraphernalia is a misdemeanor, and therefore a citation could have been
issued absent an arrest. See Idaho Code § 19-3901 (“as to any misdemeanor or infraction triable
by a magistrate, a law enforcement officer may, in lieu of making a written complaint, issue to
the defendant a uniform citation containing a complaint and a summons to appear in a form and
in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court.”) Although the State elicited testimony
from the officer that the possession of paraphernalia was “an arrestable offense,” it failed to put
on evidence that the officer would have actually arrested Mr. McMullen on the misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia charge. (Tr., p.31, Ls.5-10.)
Further, the State failed to establish whether the item of paraphernalia would be
possessed by the driver or the passenger, where the location of the item in the vehicle was
ambiguous. The item of drug paraphernalia, a brass pipe fitting, was located on the transmission
tunnel, just forward of the seat, in a container with miscellaneous odds and ends in it. (Tr., p.30,
L.20 – p.31, L.4.) Had the methamphetamine not been found in Mr. McMullen’s pants pursuant
to the unlawful Terry frisk, it is unlikely the officer would have assumed the brass fitting
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containing residue belonged to Mr. McMullen, and there is no additional evidence in the record
which would support such a conclusion. Notably, Mr. Collier, the passenger, was never asked if
the brass fitting belonged to him. (Tr., p.31, Ls.23-25.) Thus, it was by no means inevitable that
Mr. McMullen would be arrested for possessing the paraphernalia item.

CONCLUSION
Mr. McMullen respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
order denying his motion to suppress, and remand to the district court for further proceedings
DATED this 3pt day of May, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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The State did not establish that Mr. McMullen would not have revoked his consent to search
the car prior to the discovery of the paraphernalia.
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